


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22 April 1954

USIA SURVEY

Memorandum of Meeting of 22 April 1954
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue, 10:00 to 12:00 a.m.

Members of Survey: Mr. James G. Reber, CIA




Observers: USIA

Mr. Henry Loomis, SA/Dir
Mr. Anthony Micocci, Evaluation Staff

State

Mr. Fisher Howe, Deputy Special Assistant,
Intelligence

CIA



1. The Schramm Report: Mr. Micocci said the Schramm Report was of little value to the USIA Evaluation Staff because it deliberately skipped substantive matter and was limited in its treatment of procedural matters. The Report recommended that 3% of the USIA budget be earmarked for research which, in terms of the present budget, would be close to \$4,500,000. Actually, the House of Representatives has approved \$400,000 for FY'55.

2. "Evaluation": Micocci is anxious to de-emphasize the word "evaluation" because of its misuse to date. The naive believe that the results of the agency's work can be evaluated conclusively. The operators dislike the sweeping aspects of evaluation.

3. USIA Evaluation at present: Micocci criticizes the evaluation that has been done to date because it was undertaken before USIA's program was firmly established, hence standards against which to measure operations are lacking. An important use of evaluation research should be to apprise the agency's plans and policy staff of whether its plans are sound, unsound or not susceptible to evaluation at any given time. Evaluation studies can verify, in whole or in part, proposed programs. To date, USIA has been doing its business on the basis of "pragmatic

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assumptions" rather than on the basis of an established body of knowledge about the countries on which its program is supposed to have an effect. Micocci recommended that comprehensive studies on each country would be preferable to the scattered ad hoc studies that have been performed to date.

Although many of the people employed by USA, State, and other agencies in the field may have valuable informed opinion about what USA's program should be, opinion alone should not be relied upon for the long pull.

Micocci emphasized that research would henceforth be conducted with the concurrence of the officers whose program was being evaluated, whenever possible.

4. Expectations from this survey: Micocci expressed the hope that this survey would determine USA needs with respect to research and intelligence. He said that in his opinion the Policy and Planning Staff had the greatest need for intelligence, in part because that Staff is further from the field where information is gleaned than are other parts of the Agency. Next to the Policy and Planning Staff, the greatest need for intelligence and research is by the individual media services and the field operators, in that order.

Micocci emphasized that research and intelligence information are primarily useful in appraising policy decisions.

A major fault of much of the evaluation research conducted within the Agency to date stems from exaggerated claims by social scientists. Social science research will make a major contribution if it does no more than reduce the subjectivity of policy decisions.

5. Subjects for Research: Public opinion polls alone are not particularly useful, in Micocci's opinion. Opinions, attitudes and expectations must all be inquired into if an effective research job to influence information policy is to be done.

6. Use of Intelligence: Micocci does not believe that his staff needs to read mountains of raw data, although he concedes that the Policy and Planning Staff might need such. He recognizes

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that the research required for USIA purposes could be divided into intelligence research and encyclopedic information. He also verified the fact that intelligence requirements can usually be defined in terms of a well-defined project. In other words, a research program must first be developed before intelligence requirements can be set forth.

7. USIA Officials as Intelligence Agents: It was pointed out that USIA agents comprise a peculiar breed of government official that is apt to have many valuable non-governmental contacts in the countries in which they operate. The question was raised as to whether USIA officials could contribute to the collection of intelligence if they were given appropriate requirements.

8. Press Analyses: Micocci said that for the most part the analyses of foreign newspapers are of little value to USIA in countries where the press is not under government control.

9. Major Tasks of USIA: The major USIA tasks that we should keep in mind in determining the agency's intelligence needs are:


(a) Selling U.S. Foreign Policy. For this the nature of the market must be precisely known;

(b) Fighting Communism. For this task USIA must be provided with as much information and intelligence as possible about the organization, activities, motives, aims, etc. of Communists in each country, especially the travel of international Communists, and the strengths and vulnerabilities of local Communist parties. Micocci pointed out that USIA is not equipped at present to do a pin-pointing job on Communism. He contrasted the output of the Voice of America, which is general and philosophical in nature with that of Radio Free Europe, RIAS, and FECON radio, which is much more specific in naming names, referring to machine operations of the Communists, and specifying their strengths and weaknesses.

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cc: Mr. Loomis
Mr. Howe



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